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consequences. For instance, glocalization à la
Chander favors large companies that can afford to
tailor their activities to each separate local market.
Google can do it, but for the new start-up just put
together in Bangalore, this endeavor is costly. In
other words, applying the law of the service recipients may protect the consumers, but it raises new
and high barriers of entry into the global market,
favoring incumbent global companies, which are
in most cases situated in developed countries. A
related side effect is that the combination of the
global economy and Chander’s proposed glocalization principle incentivizes service providers to
tailor their services to the laws and mores of the
country of destination, often neglecting their own
locality. For example, think of an Israeli start-up
that develops a sophisticated ﬁltering technology
meant to prevent children from accessing pornography. The designers of the technology embed
their understanding of the deﬁnition of pornography in the country where they intend to market
their product. The designers in Kfar Saba in Israel
may well attempt to imagine the community standards in, for example, faraway places like Alabama
or California.12 The local Israeli market is simply
too small to bother about. Parents in liberal Tel
Aviv will be offered the same ﬁlters, with its
embedded values, as those in the more conservative U.S. Bible Belt, or perhaps the more permissive U.S. West Coast. In other words, complying
with a foreign law might be at the expense of the
local community. What matters is the size of the
markets in the areas of the importer and exporter
of information services.
Chander beautifully weaves together theory,
practice, trade, culture, and politics into a complex
yet clear argument, a sophisticated yet down-toearth analysis, and a beautifully written text.
While glocalization and harmonization are not
perfect, the alternatives, as Chander elaborates, are
probably worse. His discussion and arguments are
timely and crucial for enabling a better global elec12
U.S. courts follow a three-prong test to deﬁne
obscene material, which is not protected by the First
Amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). The ﬁrst prong is whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would
ﬁnd that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. Id. at 30 –31.
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tronic environment. The book is a highly important contribution to the discussion about international trade, globalization studies, and the
ongoing debate about the role of the law in a
dynamic technological setting. Chander paves a
new path in all these discourses. His analysis is
informed by international law and conﬂict of laws,
together with a deep understanding of the implications of globalization. He constantly reminds us
of the human face of the net-work—to use the globalization studies lingo—and he is keenly sensitive
to the human rights aspects of the topic at stake.
The Electronic Silk Road opens up a new set of
issues with which the global or local “we” are
bound to engage in the near future.
MICHAEL BIRNHACK
Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University

BOOK REVIEWS
Taming Globalization: International Law, the U.S.
Constitution, and the New World Order. By
Julian Ku and John Yoo. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. viii, 272.
Index. $35.
According to Julian Ku of Hofstra University
School of Law and John Yoo of the University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law, globalization
poses a signiﬁcant threat to the U.S. constitutional
system of governance. In their recent book, Taming Globalization: International Law, the U.S. Constitution, and the New World Order, they seek to
reassure readers that this threat can be deﬂected. If
their prescriptions are followed, Ku and Yoo
argue, the United States can avoid constitutional
problems while continuing to reap the beneﬁts of
international cooperation. Ku and Yoo insist
that they are neither trying to stop globalization
(a hopeless endeavor in any event) nor categorically opposed to the international community’s
efforts to regulate globalization’s effects. Instead,
their approach is “accommodationist” (p. 13);
they offer three proposals to alleviate the “tension” between international governance and the
U.S. Constitution (p. 2). First, U.S. courts
should presume that treaties are not self-executing
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and should enforce them only if Congress has
adopted implementing legislation. Second, customary international law (CIL) should have the
status of federal law only if Congress has adopted
legislation implementing the CIL norm. In the
absence of such legislation, Congress and the
courts should defer to both presidential interpretations of CIL and presidential decisions about
compliance with CIL. Third, individual U.S.
states ought to have more autonomy in deciding
whether and how to implement international obligations, especially those that affect traditional
state interests.
Taking the position that academics have
“battled to a stalemate” about whether these proposals are constitutionally required (p. 11), Ku
and Yoo seek, instead, to defend them on functional grounds—that is, on the basis of their
consequences for democracy and foreign-policy
decision making within the United States. As
explained below, the authors’ functional analysis is
curiously truncated. Adopting their proposals
would make it harder for the United States to realize the beneﬁts of international cooperation. Ku
and Yoo ignore this consequence in their functional analysis, an omission that is particularly
strange given the authors’ acknowledgment that
these beneﬁts can be substantial.
When the omitted costs of Ku and Yoo’s proposals are added back into the equation, it
becomes clear that, despite their assurances, Ku
and Yoo are not actually offering a prescription for
“how the American constitutional system can
embrace the intensive levels of cooperation
required to tackle global problems” (p. 254).
Instead, they are offering a prescription for hampering international cooperation in the service of
a contested view of what the U.S. Constitution
requires.
How exactly do Ku and Yoo frame the problems
that their proposals would alleviate? In their view,
globalization and global governance render two
aspects of the U.S. constitutional order particularly vulnerable: federalism and the separation of
powers. Federalism is imperiled because international agreements increasingly regulate subjects
that used to be within individual U.S. states’ control. As examples, Ku and Yoo cite not only
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human rights treaties but also treaties that govern
wills and child custody. Separation of powers is
threatened, in their view, by international regulatory responses that delegate authority away from
Congress and the president to international institutions (p. 16). The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) exempliﬁes this concern.
Under NAFTA, duties on goods from Canada or
Mexico can be challenged only before binational
arbitration panels, and the decisions of those panels cannot be appealed to any U.S. institution.1
For this reason, Ku and Yoo maintain, NAFTA
effects a “complete” transfer of “a sovereign power
of the United States (the power to impose customs
duties on imports)” to an international institution
(p. 31).
Ku and Yoo hope to safeguard more than just
federalism and the separation of powers, however.
Their functional analysis speciﬁes four additional
goals. They seek to enhance democracy—“that is,
a cluster of values, including popular representation, accountability, transparency, and deliberation, among others” (p. 104). They also want to
ensure that U.S. foreign-policy decisions are
coherent (that is, the United States speaks with
one voice), well-informed (that is, based on comprehensive information that is collected and analyzed by foreign-relations experts), and nimble
enough to keep pace with world events. Ku and
Yoo build a functional case for their three proposals by comparing how well different branches of
the federal and state governments are able to serve
these four goals. The authors acknowledge that
they “necessarily base [their] institutional assessment on certain generalizations and assumptions
about how these institutions work, because it
would be difﬁcult to conduct a sufﬁciently rigorous empirical test of these functional claims”
(p. 127).
In making the case for their ﬁrst proposal, Ku
and Yoo argue that non-self-execution enhances
political accountability and deliberation by
involving the House of Representatives in treaty
implementation. The House is designed to be
especially responsive to the electorate’s demands
1
North American Free Trade Agreement,, U.S.Can.-Mex., Art. 1904(11), Dec. 8, 1992, 32 ILM 605,
683 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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and includes members who hold a wide range of
policy views. Requiring its participation in treaty
implementation will “encourage the production
of information, cause viewpoints on the extreme
ends of legislator preferences to confront more
moderate views, and result in the giving of public
justiﬁcations and reasons for decisions” (p. 208).
At the same time, non-self-execution prevents the
courts—the most politically insulated branch of
the federal government—from taking any steps at
all to enforce treaties unless and until Congress as
a whole has acted. The political branches’ superior
ability to collect and assess information supports
this allocation of roles, Ku and Yoo argue. They
claim that the need for timely policymaking does
too, although their assertion that “Congress can
enact nationwide rules more quickly than the
courts” (p. 109) is certainly contestable.
Ku and Yoo undertake a similar analysis to justify their proposal regarding CIL. They maintain
that the United States will be able to pursue its
foreign-policy goals more effectively if compliance
with CIL is discretionary rather than mandatory,
at least when Congress has not adopted legislation
requiring compliance. Based on a comparative
institutional analysis, Ku and Yoo argue that the
executive branch is better suited than the courts to
decide when compliance is a wise policy choice for
the following reasons. The executive branch is
more politically accountable than the courts and
has a greater capacity to collect and analyze relevant information. The executive branch can also
reach a decision and can deploy other foreign-policy tools to support whatever decision it makes
regarding CIL.
These ﬁrst two proposals have been much
debated in the academic literature. Ku and Yoo’s
third proposal— enhancing the role of state governments in implementing international norms—
is more novel: they describe it as “perhaps [the]
most radical” of the three (p. 14). To shore up state
autonomy, Ku and Yoo encourage the federal
political branches to exercise two kinds of self-restraint. First, they endorse reservations to preclude
the United States from taking on new international obligations that affect matters that are traditionally governed by state law, including criminal law, public morals, contracts, torts, property,
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trusts and estates, and family law. In the absence of
international obligations, Congress has no reason
and no authority under the U.S. Constitution to
displace state laws on these subjects. Second,
where the United States does enter into treaties
that address matters that have traditionally been
regulated by states, the authors encourage the federal government to forgo implementing legislation. Instead, they encourage relying on individual
U.S. states to implement the United States’ treaty
obligations. Finally, Ku and Yoo emphasize that
any decision to preempt state laws ought to be
made by the political branches rather than the
courts.
Ku and Yoo justify their third proposal on the
grounds that the U.S. state political branches not
only surpass the federal courts in foreign-policy
competence but sometimes even surpass the federal political branches. In particular, they describe
the U.S. states’ expertise and access to information
in those areas of law and policy within their traditional control as superior. Ku and Yoo concede
that the U.S. states are less capable of achieving a
uniform and coherent foreign policy. But Ku and
Yoo are untroubled by this prospect: in their
view, maintaining U.S. state autonomy will often
be more important than ensuring either coherence
or compliance with international obligations
(p. 165).
The authors frame their functional analysis as
addressing the question of who decides whether
the United States will comply with its international obligations rather than whether the United
States should comply (p. 92). But their proposals
are not neutral when it comes to the question of
whether to comply. Every one of their recommendations reduces the probability that the United
States will comply with its international obligations. Ku and Yoo’s ﬁrst two proposals would render the courts unavailable to ensure compliance in
the absence of congressional legislation. Similarly,
if the United States relies exclusively on its states to
implement its international obligations, the probability is high that at least one state would decline
to do so, thereby putting the United States in
breach of its obligations.
Nor are Ku and Yoo’s proposals neutral on the
question of whether the United States should
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participate in international efforts either to secure
the beneﬁts of globalization or to mitigate its
harms. A presumption of non-self-execution is
especially likely to impede U.S. participation.2
To avoid violating its international obligations,
the United States generally does not ratify nonself-executing treaties unless and until implementing legislation is in place.3 Enacting implementing legislation is not easy; many treaties that
have been approved by the Senate remain unratiﬁed because Congress has not approved implementing legislation.4 The more that treaties
require implementing legislation, the more significant this roadblock becomes.
A set of proposals that encumber the United
States’ ability to secure the beneﬁts of international cooperation might be justiﬁed on func2
Ku and Yoo acknowledge this consequence: “It is
true that non-self-execution raises the transaction costs
of making international agreements with domestic
effect” (p. 107). And they further note: “It seems undeniable that following the basic forms of domestic lawmaking— congressional control over legislation, presidential leadership in interpretation, or maintaining
the interstitial nature of federal law against a background of state lawmaking— creates more arduous
requirements for creating international law and organizations” (p. 258). But their functional analysis disregards these costs entirely.
3
Robert E. Dalton, United States, in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 765, 789 (Duncan B.
Hollis, Merritt R. Blakeslee & L. Benjamin Ederington
eds., 2005).
4
E.g., Convention Providing a Uniform Law on
the Form of an International Will, Oct. 26, 1973,
S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-29 (1986), 12 ILM 1298
(1973), available at http://www.unidroit.org/
instruments/succession [hereinafter Washington Convention]; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 UNTS 57, 28 ILM 657
(1989); Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 108 AJIL 532, 533 (2014); see also
Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and
Future of International Lawmaking in the United States,
117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1313 n.225 (2008); STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 106TH CONG.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE
20 (Comm. Print 2001), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT106SPRT66922.pdf (“Treaties approved by the Senate
have sometimes remained unfulﬁlled for long periods
because implementing legislation was not passed.”).
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tional grounds if those beneﬁts were trivial or nonexistent. But at no point do Ku and Yoo suggest
that the beneﬁts of international cooperation are
so trivial that they can be ignored.
To the contrary, the authors acknowledge that
successful international cooperation can and does
yield substantial beneﬁts. Indeed, they appreciate
that some problems, such as transboundary pollution or chemical weapons, can only be solved
through international cooperation (pp. 52, 253–
54). At one point, Ku and Yoo even invoke the
development of the administrative state during the
New Deal to explain the appeal of international
regulation and international institutions. “As the
scope of economic activity had become national,”
Ku and Yoo observe, “effective government regulation had to extend its reach to keep pace” (p. 61).
Simultaneously, “government institutions had to
change in order to come to grips with the complexity and speed of the new markets” (p. 62), and so
Congress began delegating regulatory authority to
administrative agencies. As the scope of economic
and other interactions becomes global, the authors
acknowledge, a parallel dynamic drives the development of international regulations and international institutions (pp. 28, 63– 64).
Since the beneﬁts of international cooperation
are substantial, as Ku and Yoo recognize, a complete functional analysis would need to explain
why the authors’ proposals remain desirable even
though they make these beneﬁts harder to realize.5
It is not obvious how this functional analysis
would come out: there is no common currency for

5
In their conclusion, Ku and Yoo brieﬂy suggest that
their proposals may facilitate international cooperation
by making the United States’ international commitments more credible and sustainable by involving more
political actors (speciﬁcally Congress and state governments) in implementing the U.S. obligations. Ku and
Yoo’s proposals are at best only partially aimed at making the United States’ international obligations harder
to breach, however. Their proposals regarding CIL and
state autonomy facilitate violations of international law,
rather than deter them. Moreover, it is not clear that a
non-self-executing treaty coupled with implementing
legislation is harder to breach than a self-executing
treaty. Because of the last-in-time rule, ordinary legislation can override both kinds of treaties.
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comparing the beneﬁts of international cooperation against the beneﬁts of state autonomy or additional deliberation by Congress. But Ku and Yoo
cannot dodge the inquiry while sustaining the
claim that a functional analysis favors their proposals.
The authors’ comparison to the New Deal reinforces this point. The important question, they
argue, is whether the New Deal “effectively
responded to the nationalization of the economy
and society with regulation of similar scope. It
seems apparent that it did” (p. 63). Had the federal
government been unable to adopt national regulation and delegate to administrative agencies, it is
difﬁcult to see how the federal government could
have achieved a comparably effective response.
Any functional analysis of alternative constitutional rules regarding the Commerce Clause or the
nondelegation doctrine would have to account for
the (in)ability of the United States to respond
effectively to the economic and societal changes
that the country faced in the early decades of the
twentieth century.
Returning to the international context, consider two examples that Ku and Yoo address at
some length. The ﬁrst involves the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations6 (VCCR) and the
fallout of the Supreme Court’s well-known decision in Medellı́n v. Texas.7 José Medellı́n was a
Mexican national who was arrested and ultimately
convicted in the Texas state courts of raping and
murdering two teenage girls. The VCCR provides
that when foreign nationals like Medellı́n are
arrested or detained they shall be informed of their
rights to communicate with a consular ofﬁcial.8
Like many foreign nationals arrested and later
convicted in U.S. courts, Medellı́n was not so
informed. The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) issued a series of decisions related to the
United States’ obligations under the VCCR, ultimately concluding in the Avena case that the
United States had an obligation to provide review
6
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261 [hereinafter
VCCR].
7
Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); see also
Agora: Medellı́n, 102 AJIL 529 (2008).
8
VCCR, supra note 6, Art. 36.
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and reconsideration to ascertain whether the
VCCR violations caused actual prejudice to each
individual defendant.9 In a decision that Ku and
Yoo applaud, the Supreme Court held in Medellı́n
that the Avena decision was not self-executing.10
The government’s brief in Medellı́n explicitly
stated that President George W. Bush had determined that compliance with the ICJ decision was
in the United States’ interests.11 Bush therefore
sought to comply with the ICJ’s decision by issuing a memorandum to the attorney general asserting that “the United States will discharge its international obligations . . . by having state courts
give effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordance with
general principles of comity . . . .”12 The Supreme
Court held, however, that the president lacked
authority to require the Texas courts to comply
with the ICJ’s decision.13 Texas state ofﬁcials were
unmoved by arguments that they should implement the ICJ’s judgment, and Medellı́n was executed without receiving the review and reconsideration that the United States was obliged to
provide.
Whether Medellı́n was rightly or wrongly decided, it is undeniable that the decision makes it
harder for the United States to comply with its
international obligations—and thus makes it
harder to secure the beneﬁts of international cooperation. On January 22, 2014, the state of Texas
executed Edgar Arias Tamayo, another Mexican
national who was not notiﬁed of his rights to communicate with a consular ofﬁcial when he was
arrested.14 A U.S. Department of State spokesperson thereafter emphasized that the beneﬁts that
9
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 ICJ REP. 12 (Mar. 31).
10
Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 532.
11
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 8 –9, Medellı́n v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984), available at http://
www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2006/2pet/5ami/20060984.pet.ami.pdf.
12
Id. at 5.
13
Medellı́n, 552 U.S. at 532.
14
See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 108 AJIL
322, 324 (2014).
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the United States derives from international cooperation were threatened: “The United States’ compliance with our international obligations under
Avena is critical to our ability to ensure consular
access and assistance for our own citizens who are
arrested or detained by foreign governments, as
well as to maintain cooperation from foreign governments on a broad range of law enforcement and
other issues.”15
How should we weigh the United States’
reduced ability to protect its citizens abroad
against the beneﬁts that Ku and Yoo identify with
non-self-execution? The authors do not say. They
do acknowledge that non-self-execution has some
costs, although they downplay them and suggest
that these costs are not very high in the consularnotiﬁcation context.16 But in an era where Congress is often deadlocked and unable to pass legislation of any kind, these costs are signiﬁcant. They
threaten to convert a presumption of non-selfexecution into a presumption of noncompliance
with international obligations, even for treaties to
which two thirds of the Senate have already consented.
The consular-notiﬁcation issue also underscores that Ku and Yoo are not even clear about
how the different goals that they consider in their
functional analysis should be traded off against
one another. Their case for non-self-execution
compares how well the executive and legislative
branches advance the goals of enhancing democracy and generating coherent, well-informed, and
nimble foreign policy to how well the courts
would do so. The comparative institutional analysis is easy for Ku and Yoo because, they argue, the
political branches surpass the courts in furthering
each of the authors’ goals. But how would the
analysis compare the executive branch alone to
the political branches together? Medellı́n’s rejec15
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Statement, Execution of
Mexican National Edgar Arias Tamayo, Statement
of Marie Harf, Deputy Department Spokesperson
( Jan. 23, 2014), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2014/01/220546.htm.
16
As Ku and Yoo note, “Deliberation also has its
potential costs, including delay in decision, but the context of setting domestic rules of general application on
questions such as criminal procedure may not incur
high costs in this area” (p. 208).
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tion of the U.S. president’s efforts to achieve
compliance with the VCCR by memorandum
raises exactly this question. Would Ku and Yoo’s
functional analysis endorse the president’s ability
to unilaterally achieve compliance? The executive
branch alone would fare better along the dimensions of coherence and speed. The two political
branches together would provide more deliberation and, perhaps, more political accountability on the issue of implementation. Both the
executive branch alone and the political branches
together could generate decisions that are informed by expertise. Ku and Yoo provide no guidance about how to weigh these considerations
against each other and do not reveal which outcome their functional analysis would favor.
The authors’ divergent proposals for treaties
and CIL raise the same question. Ku and Yoo
maintain that the president should have discretion
to implement CIL on his own, unless Congress has
adopted legislation that sets a policy requiring (or
prohibiting) such compliance. On their functional account, why should the president not have
comparable authority to implement treaty obligations—including those at issue in Medellı́n?
Indeed, promoting deliberation is arguably less
important for treaties than CIL because two
thirds of the Senate have explicitly consented to
the former.
Now consider a second example— one that has
received considerably less attention than the consular notiﬁcation issue—the Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will (Washington Convention).17 Ku and
Yoo cite the Washington Convention to illustrate
the kind of U.S. state autonomy that they hope
to promote. But the Washington Convention is
unusual along several dimensions, and these
unusual features preclude it from providing
meaningful support for general propositions
about how to reconcile globalization with U.S.
state autonomy.
A bit of background information is needed to
understand why. One feature of globalization is
the increasing likelihood that a person will live and
accumulate property in two or more countries
17

Washington Convention, supra note 4.
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during her lifetime as a result of travel, immigration, temporary work abroad, or retirement to a
foreign country. This trend, in turn, increases the
likelihood that the person will execute a will in one
country and then die in another.18 The Washington Convention addresses that eventuality. It
establishes a new type of will—an “international
will”—with speciﬁed formal criteria. The Washington Convention allows individuals to execute
wills that will be recognized as valid as to form by
other parties to the agreement.19 Because U.S.
states have traditionally regulated probate matters,
the Washington Convention triggers Ku and
Yoo’s concerns about eroding federalism.
The United States signed the Washington
Convention in 1973. A number of U.S. states
subsequently adopted legislation to implement
the Convention and establish the possibility of
executing an “international will” consistent with
the Convention. According to Ku and Yoo, these
individual states have “essentially decided to enter
into the Washington Convention themselves
through their enactment of law implementing that
convention” (p. 172). Thus, the authors claim that
the Washington Convention “illustrates how
states can play a central role in the fulﬁllment of
international obligations” (p. 173).
But the Washington Convention is not an
example of relying on states to fulﬁll international
obligations because the United States has no
obligations under the Washington Convention:
the United States is not a party. When President
Ronald Reagan submitted the Washington Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent, he
set out a bifurcated plan for its implementation.20
Individual U.S. states could choose whether to
make the beneﬁts of the Washington Convention
available to their own residents: they would not be
required to do so. But all U.S. states would be
obliged to recognize the formal validity of interna-

tional wills, whether or not they chose to adopt
legislation permitting their own citizens to make
international wills. Although the Senate consented to ratiﬁcation in 1991,21 Congress has not
adopted such legislation. And in the absence of
such legislation, the executive branch did not ratify the Convention—presumably because it
judged the risk of noncompliance with the
United States’ obligations to be intolerably high.
The only reason that individual U.S. states can
still secure the beneﬁts of the Washington Convention for their own residents is that the Washington Convention is drafted in a very atypical
way. Most treaties reﬂect a quid pro quo and
make their beneﬁts available only to parties. But
the beneﬁts of the Washington Convention do
not depend on reciprocity. Instead, the Washington Convention requires parties to recognize all
wills that meet the Convention’s criteria.22 This
feature is the one that allows individual states to
provide their residents the option of writing international wills that will be recognized as valid by
parties to the Washington Convention without
the United States itself being a party. To put it
mildly, this peculiarity makes the Washington
Convention a poor example for establishing the
beneﬁts of the authors’ proposal for reconciling
international cooperation and federalism.
The Washington Convention model is limited
in still another way: the beneﬁt that the Washington Convention confers is not a public good. We
can give residents of Montana the option of drafting an international will without automatically
providing that option to residents of Vermont.
That is not the case when the beneﬁt that a treaty
confers is an intact ozone layer or a world that is
free from chemical weapons. Indeed, Ku and Yoo
acknowledge that achieving the goals of the
Chemical Weapons Convention,23 for example,
21

18

John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of International Property Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 461, 483– 84
(2012).
19
Washington Convention, supra note 4.
20
See Letter of Transmittal, Convention Providing
a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will,
S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-29, 1973 UST LEXIS 321
( July 2, 1986), available at http://www.cabinetchone.
com/message.
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137 CONG. REC. S12131 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991).
Washington Convention, supra note 4, Art. I(1) &
Annex Art. 1 (noting that “[a] will shall be valid as
regards form, irrespective particularly of the place where
it is made, of the location of the assets and of the nationality, domicile or residence of the testator, if it is made
in the form of an international will complying with the
provisions set out in Articles 2 to 5 hereinafter”).
23
Convention on the Prohibition, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
22
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requires uniform implementation. Relying wholly
on states to implement international obligations
will, in almost every case, put the beneﬁts of international cooperation beyond the reach of not only
individual U.S. states but also the United States as
a whole.
Ku and Yoo’s three marquee proposals are thus
more costly and less advantageous than the
authors acknowledge. The book leaves the reader
uncertain about one ﬁnal point: whether the
authors themselves view their three proposals as
sufﬁcient to remedy globalizations’ threats to the
American constitutional order. There are some
suggestions that the three proposals are only the
least controversial part of a more radical package.
Recall the NAFTA dispute settlement provisions that Ku and Yoo invoke to illustrate the
threat that globalization poses to separation of
powers.24 How would NAFTA— or U.S. law
relating to NAFTA— change if Ku and Yoo’s
three proposals were implemented? The answer
appears to be not at all. Ku and Yoo’s proposals
regarding CIL and state autonomy do not apply to
NAFTA. The presumption against self-execution
would not change anything either. NAFTA was
never considered to be self-executing; Congress
approved NAFTA and adopted implementing
legislation in a single action. That legislation
included a provision that explicitly makes speciﬁed decisions of the NAFTA tribunals ﬁnal and
unreviewable.25 If NAFTA’s “transfer of a sovereign power of the United States” to an international institution (p. 31) is a real problem, their
proposals would not address it. A presumption
against self-execution does not preclude such
transfers. As Ku and Yoo assert, that presumption
“just ensures that before the United States undertakes a signiﬁcant change in the nature of its international commitments, it uses the regular means
of domestic policy-making to reach a decision”
(p. 103).
Elsewhere in the book, however, Ku and Yoo
seem to endorse or assume additional constitutional limits on international cooperation that
Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 103-21 (1993), 32 ILM 800 (1993).
24
See NAFTA, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
25
19 U.S.C. §1516a(g)(2).
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would affect U.S. participation in NAFTA and
other international institutions much more dramatically. They suggest that Article III, federalism
principles, the Appointments Clause, and the
nondelegation doctrine impose restrictions on the
kinds of international arrangements in which the
United States can participate and on the kinds of
implementing legislation that Congress could
approve. Ku and Yoo assert, for example, that Article III may prohibit U.S. participation in NAFTA’s
dispute settlement system and that the Appointments Clause may render the Chemical Weapons
Convention’s enforcement provisions unconstitutional (pp. 75–77). Whether and how these constitutional requirements constrain participation in
international institutions is contested by scholars
and is far from resolved by the courts.26 The practical consequences of accepting such controversial
constitutional limitations, however, would be farreaching. Such limitations would do much more
than Ku and Yoo’s three proposals to curtail
“transfers” of “the power to control and implement international legal obligations . . . to independent international institutions” (p. 16). But
they would do so by imperiling U.S. participation
in key international agreements. It is difﬁcult to
believe that any functional analysis that considers
this consequence could support Ku and Yoo’s
interpretation.
Ku and Yoo are by no means alone in their
anxiety about how globalization will affect governance within the United States. But there is considerable dissonance between the reassuring rhetoric that they use to describe their goals and the
practical consequences of accepting their proposals. While Ku and Yoo’s proposals may offer some
advantages, they are accompanied by signiﬁcant
costs, and Ku and Yoo err in discounting them.
KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS
University of Michigan Law School
26
Joined by two other justices, Justice Antonin Scalia
endorsed federalism limitations in his concurring opinion in Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2098 –102
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also, e.g., CURTIS A.
BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL
SYSTEM 97–137 (2013); Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 MD. L.
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